



Network Monitoring & Anomaly Detection in ISC/SCADA

SCADA Security Conference 2019 Prague

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


Flowmon
Driving Network Visibility

What is SCADA?

- **SCADA** is a control system architecture that uses computers, networked data communications and graphical user interfaces for high-level process supervisory management
- Cyber-physical system where **availability**, **performance** and **reliability** are the top concerns – **not security**.
- **Industrial Control Systems (ICS)** – geographically dispersed assets PLCs
- **Distributed Control Systems (DCS)** – locally significant controllers in a plant, they control batch-oriented (continuous) processes in refineries, petrochemical, and so on

Security Policies	IT Network	IoT Network
Focus	Protecting Intellectual Property and Company Assets	24/7 Operations, High OEE, Safety, and Ease of Use
Priorities	1. Confidentiality 2. Integrity 3. Availability	1. Availability 2. Integrity 3. Confidentiality
Types of Data Traffic	Converged Network of Data, Voice and Video (Hierarchical)	Converged Network of Data, Control Protocols, Information, Safety and Motion (P2P & Hierarchical)
Implications of a Device Failure	Continues to Operate	Could Stop Processes, Impact Markets, Physical Harm
Threat Protection	Shut Down Access to Detected Threat and Remediate	Potentially Keep Operating with a Detected Threat
Upgrades and Patch Mgmt	ASAP During Uptime	Scheduled During Downtime
Infrastructure Life Cycle	Equipment upgrades and refresh <5yr	Avoid Equipment upgrades (lifespan 15+ yrs)
Deployment conditions	Controlled physical environments	Harsh environments (temp, vibration, etc)



SCADA is Unsecure



Non-secure / or
few secure end
points



Absence of
network visibility


“An important drawback derived from the connection to intranets and communication networks, is the increased vulnerability to computer network-based attacks.”

Source: European Union Agency for Network and Information Security

Absence of
technological
security design
and processes



Irregular
patching of IT
systems



Obsolete
equipment
and OS



What's inside SCADA?

- Specialized devices with JeOS operating system
 - No password or only the default one
- "Industrial" computers with OS Windows / Linux
 - Obsolete
 - No updates/patches
 - No advanced security
- Endpoint security cannot be ensured
- Exposed to modern threats just like conventional IT environment
- Additionally, exposed to long forgotten threats



Segmentation (DMZ, WiFi, PCN...)
Security Gap: Patching, Media (USB
etc.), Interconnection & no NAC...
Missing deep network visibility!
Missing in security design!

Admin

Advantage:
Stable flows in SCADA
Network!

ALERT!

infection!
anomaly!
upload!

Attacker (F&C)

Flowmon

Driving Network Visibility

Enterprise / Outside
world



Admin

Engineering
Station

HMI
Stations

ICS network

Database
Server

FM Probe

Botnet Infection

Application /
File Server

Router

OPC
Server

FM Probe

Network Telemetry
Collection
Learning Baselines



RTU/PLC



Voltage
Sensor

Current
Sensor

Relay

Wired or Wireless
Link



Flowmon Collector

Diagnostics of
telemetry data
**! Alert or
notification sent**

RTU/PLC



Pressure
Sensor


Pump

Level
Sensor



What is Passive Network Monitoring?

- Works with copy of the network traffic = no impact on network
- Provides rich network telemetry (IPFIX – IETF standard)
- Analyzes all the network layers from L2-L7
- Reduces amount of data for analysis (500:1)





Internet, Public Cloud

L4



Corporate network

L3,5




DMZ




Firewalls

L3



Scada network

L2



HMI / Operations

L1



PLC

L0




Technological network


Firewalls protect communications between the perimeter of the network and the DMZ. However they do not provide any visibility and detection methods inside of the Scada environment. The easiest way to intrude and attack the Scada system is to bring an infected laptop and connect to the network e.g. during planned maintenance. Malicious activity will never be visible to the Firewall.


Flowmon specializes in the monitoring of communications inside IP networks. It provides a deep understanding of all communication between servers and end stations inside the Scada server as well as communications between Scada servers and HMIs. It provides comprehensive troubleshooting capability to tackle configurations issues, errors, as well as performance degradation. Leveraging machine learning and anomaly detection Flowmon can detect suspicious behaviour even if no signatures are available for that type of malicious behaviour.

Monitoring of the Entire Attack Path

From Internet and VPN, business networks to OT environment








In this simulation we'll demonstrate a cyber attack targeting an ICS environment. ICS are systems that control industrial technologies. In our case it is a power plant. ICS/SCADA networks are generally very vulnerable to external influences, since any change can directly lead to a restriction or complete shutdown. Which subsequently leads to a huge damage to the organization and their customers. Even though we attempt to completely isolate ICS from the Internet and outsiders in general, it is never possible to contain all threats.



A suppliers service engineer enters the control system room to perform operations and maintenance checks beyond the scope of surveillance system.


He connects to the technological network and accesses the control PLC. His notebook is infected with malware, which is activated only when connected to the control network. Obviously, the engineer isn't aware of this.







At the start of his maintenance activities, all indicators are normal. We're now looking at the temperature of the cooling medium in the tertiary circuit.

The state of the system and activities of the engineer are constantly monitored by the local surveillance center. Nothing suggests anything unusual yet.





The engineer carries out his activities. However in the background an attack on the control system is now underway in order to gain unauthorized access to one of the power stations and disrupt the generation of electricity. Meanwhile identification of potentially vulnerable systems in the network is in progress.




The monitored indicators still seem to be normal.
The surveillance system for the production of electrical
energy does not show any anomalies.



However, the system has been compromised and the temperature of the cooling medium is rising.



The engineer has finished his work, disconnected from the system and now leaving the facility.



When a critical temperature is reached and an alarm is triggered.




The engineer immediately moves to the technical room to check the cause of the alarm.



The technical room is already full of smoke.



The engineer is manually shutting the system down to remediate the situation.



This power plant was fortunate to have an engineer on site who could manually intervene. If that hadn't been the case, the damage would've been inevitable. Now let's take a look at how little it would take to detect and resolve the problem in timely manner.

At the time of connecting to the control network, Flowmon ADS identified a new device in the network. This is expected behavior, because the new device was actually connected.

The screenshot displays the 'Event details' window in Flowmon ADS. The event is categorized as 'New or alien device (ALIENDEV)' and occurred on 2018-03-23 at 16:47:24. The event source is identified by the MAC address fe80::20c:29ff:fe71:72a6. The system reports a 100% probability of detection, with no false positives, and the user identity is SELKS. The event was detected by the default instance. A detail note specifies: 'Detail: New device, MAC address: 00:0C:29:71:72:A6, detected by MAC address.' Below the event details, there are tabs for 'Targets (2)', 'Comments (0)', 'Categories (0)', and 'Event evidence'. The 'Targets (2)' tab is active, showing two targets: the MAC address fe80::20c:29ff:fe71:72a6 and the IP address 192.168.222.63.

Event details		
Type: New or alien device (ALIENDEV)	Event source: fe80::20c:29ff:fe71:72a6	Probability: 100 %
Timestamp: 2018-03-23 16:47:24	Captured source hostname: N/A	False positive: No
First Flow: 2018-03-23 16:47:24	Data feed: Default	User Identity: SELKS
Detected by instance: Default		
Detail: New device, MAC address: 00:0C:29:71:72:A6, detected by MAC address.		

Targets (2) | Comments (0) | Categories (0) | Event evidence

All targets | By country | By IP

fe80::20c:29ff:fe71:72a6 | 192.168.222.63

During the engineers activity, malware looks for devices in the network which can be attacked. The scan runs on port 139, the Samba protocol, which has a number of vulnerabilities.

Event details

Type: Port scanning (SCANS)
Timestamp: 2018-03-23 17:50:00
First Flow: 2018-03-23 17:49:35

Event source: 192.168.222.63
Captured source hostname: N/A
Data feed: Default
Detected by instance: Default

Probability: 100 %
False positive: No
User Identity: localhost

Detail: chaotic TCP SYN scan (attempts with response: 14, attempts without response: 22, targets: 13, port(s): 139, 41345, 35012, 32102, 34492, 35089, 38191, 43823, 44007, 34617, 42607).

Targets (13)

Comments (0)

Categories (0)

Event evidence

Traffic recording

All targets

By country

By IP

192.168.222.65	192.168.222.35	192.168.222.49	192.168.222.38	192.168.222.61	192.168.222.9
192.168.222.15	192.168.222.1	192.168.222.5	192.168.222.3	192.168.222.4	192.168.222.13
192.168.222.14					

Subsequently, malware attacks the vulnerable station in order to gain unauthorized access, escalate permissions, and damage the production process. We can see an event that represents the described attack.

Event details

Type: Dictionary attacks (DICTATTACK)
Timestamp: 2018-03-23 17:55:00
First Flow: 2018-03-23 17:54:20

Event source: 192.168.222.63
Captured source hostname: N/A
Data feed: Default
Detected by instance: Default


Probability: 100 %
False positive: No
User Identity: localhost

Detail: SAMBA dictionary attack, attempts: 24, ports: 139, attack duration: 161.026 seconds (2m 41s), average time between attempts: 7.001 seconds.

Targets (1)Comments (0)Categories (0)Event evidenceTraffic recording

All targetsBy countryBy IP

192.168.222.2



Monitoring and early detection of security incidents is essential for the protection of SCADA/industrial control systems. Their independence and separation from the surrounding environment does not mean these systems cannot be the target of an attack. ICS systems are functional and reliable, but based on legacy technologies which goes hand in hand with their security. Imagine the possible consequences of this attack happening in a nuclear power plant. That said, visibility into network communication and early detection is vital.

Thank you

Performance monitoring, visibility and security with a single solution

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Flowmon

Driving Network Visibility